Category Archives: 比较政治学

Back to Work (D3)-DPJ presidential election 2015

The result of 2012 party presidential election and the later revisions of the selection rules in 2013 revealed that a national favorite candidate from the party’s base in the prefectural branches is more likely to capture a final victory in the LDP. Now, we are observing the same trend in the biggest opposition party of Japan, the DPJ.

On Jan 18th, the DPJ will select its party leader among three candidates, Nagatuma, Hosono and Okada. All of them had served in the cabinet during the DPJ regime, and Okada was the Party leader in 2004~2005. What make this campaign interesting to watch are not just the tense competitions among three key players, but also more of how the selection rules work, who decide the leader. According to the party laws, DPJ applies an electoral-college way of involving local members and Diet members simultaneously in voting. The rank and file members, local supporters and the party’s local assembly members hold 495 points, almost 65% of the total 760 votes. It is the first presidential election that local votes exceed those lawmakers in the Diet. Similar to the LDP, a nationwide popular candidate would be more competitive to become the winner of this leadership contest. It is significant to notice that both parties(LDP & DPJ) are applying a broader inclusiveness to decide their leader.

The following link is a press conference of three candidates at JNPC.

 

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Gerald Curtis on 2014 Japan elections

 

I was planning to write something more. anyhow

I do recommend anyone interested in Japanese politics, or Asian politics, watch this video.

source: FCCJ. 2014/12/15

論文ー政党研究理論

Exceptionalism political science and the comparative analysis of political parties. 

*Alan Ware

University of Oxford

Happy to see other scholars look into the same problem as I pointed out in my paper… But obviously he did a better job than me.

 In Europe a way of thinking about parties has developed that, while not truly ‘excetpionalist’, is certainly ‘regionalist’ in that it focuses on party change largely with respect to the operation of parties within just the European content.  Neither side- Americanist nor Europeanist- believes that it has that much to learn from the other. 

Conclusion

Despite some developments noted earlier, the study of party organizations remains largely ‘regionalized’. One of the adverse consequences over the last four decades of this ‘regionalization‘ of research on organizational change has been that it has been tended to lead to regional differences in organizational responses by parties being exaggerated or misconceived. For example, it is sometimes said European parties are ‘team sport’ whereas American parties are an ‘individual sport’, as if we were thereby dealing with very different kinds of entity. Some analytic frameworks, such as ‘ambition theory’, had specifically emphasized this aspect of American party politics, of course. Two points may be made about this. First, American party politics, like party politics elsewhere, is ”team sport’, and one cannot make sense of American politics over the last two decades if one sees it purely as a conflict involving individuals. … Secondly, the real point about team sport is that the individual players, and correspondingly limit the ability of a coach or manager to dictate precisely what happens in play.The utility of returning to the kind of comparative framework Epstein, following Duverger, was developing four decades ago is that it enables us to look at how parties operating under different rules of the game respond to changes in their environments that are common to all of them. This is not to argue against the continuation of ‘regionalist’ studies, fort they will surely remain an important source of our knowledge of party organizations. Rather, it is to argue for supplementing such work by the development of analytic frameworks that recognize the significance of all factors that shape how all parties go about organizing their business in democratic. It is time to weaken the grip that ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘regionalism’ have had on research into the party structure.   

* Government and Opposition, Vol.46, No.4, pp.411-435, 2011.

 

on the gap of institutional design and outcomes/effects

By Paul Pierson

Political In Time:History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. 2004. Princeton University Press.

Chapter 4, page 120.

Limitation 6: The Problem of actor discontinuity

 

Even absent major environmental change, “gaps” may emerge because the actors who inherit institutional arrangements are not the same as those who designed them. Indeed, a major ambiguity in theories of rational institutional design concerns institutional inheritors. What does actor-centered functionalism imply about the benefits of institutions to those who inherit them? Political institutions are typically long lived. Given that institutions will usually outlive the people who create them, we wish to know whether the originally “functional” aspects should be expected to remain in the interests of following generations (e.g., because those followers are much the same sort of those as the creators).

 

Typically, actor-centered functionalism seems to rest (although usually only implicitly) on strong assumptions about actor continuity. In the study of international relations, for instance, where there has been a great deal of actor-centered functionalist work, this assumption of actor continuity is common. Indeed, it may not be unreasonable since “states” are taken to be the main designers of international institutions—and many international relations scholars argue that the interests of states are quite sharply defined by the structure of the international system.

 

What, however, if there are reasons to question this premise of actor continuity—that is, to consider the possibilities that actors making initial institutional choices may well have quite distinctive preferences from those of their inheritors? This problem is only unimportant if we think that designers’ choices will be inherited by actors much like themselves. With the passage of time, however, this assumption becomes more problematic. This will be so especially in setting where the assumption of some stable overarching context that generates a stable pattern of preferences seems implausible. In the context of long—term institutional development the language of “actors” elides a huge amount—who the actors are is often ambiguous. Who, we might ask, are the “inheritors” of the American constitution’s framers? Are they “the same” in some clear analytical sense? It is not clear to me that these are answerable questions.

reference: Political Leadership and Core Executive

就如何分析党内的权力构造演变,Y推荐了篇文章,

伊藤, 光利

政治的リーダーシップ論とコア・エグゼクティブ(CE)論 : CEの比較分析枠組と日本のケース
『神戸法學雜誌』  神戸大学 2007  2007-12  Vol.57 Num.3 pp 1-89
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110006627932/

伊藤光利,是与松村歧夫,田中爱治等老师一起出过有关日本政治体系,过程论的相关教科书的教授。

本文的文风如旧,一上来就是针对目前政治学界对于leadership分析的文献较少,既有的问题进行了分析,

介绍了英国的core executive 理论,并用该理论框架来分析了日本,虽然文章很长。。。 但是甚有意思,

针对leadership 的研究,过去多数集中在心理学,宪法学等等,在政治学里面,是相对停滞的。

提出leadership论和CE论,CE论解决之前leadership 论里面没有涵盖的部分。

过去的分析框架

1,leader 个人的因素
2,leadership 的环境的变量
3,历史制度论,存在的问题

CE论的核心,在于micro- level 和macro-level 都要结合起来。

这里核心介绍了英国和日本的core executive, 还指出了在美,英,德模式下,日本比较接近于德国。

日本的CE论具有以下的特点

1,扩散的CE networks
2,存在政策领域,不同省厅的区别
3,日本的CE与官僚之间,存在首相对于官僚的控制薄弱的既有问题,而且两边缺乏相互信任。

他这里提出来一个非常有意思的问题,那就是2001年体制,所谓平成之后日本首相的在政策决定中的作用和角色的提高,

到底是94年选举制度改革和97-01年行政体系改革的结果呢?还是LDP面对在野党的压力,为了提高自己的支持率而打出的首相个人支持的牌呢?

这是个非常有意思的话题,因为如果真的是制度起作用了,那么为什么小泉之后的Leadership都fail了呢?

再者,如果说是后者?那么为什么安倍第二次政权又出现了和小泉类似的趋势,长期稳定有成果的执政呢?

那么问题到底在哪里?本文章里面没有最后的答案。

另外日本官僚体系还存在的问题就是,在录用环节上各个省厅有区别,带来在bottom-up 直接管理上的区别。

具体论据就是,1986年和2002年的两次针对career- 官僚的问卷调查,题目是你认为,在你所在的省厅,来自于外部的影响政策形成和执行的因素有哪些?

1986年的时候,排第一的是,族议员;
2002年的时候,排第一的是,首相。

可是问题也在这里了,但是时任首相koizumi 以那么高的人气当选,而且也刚刚完成省厅改造,这个考察时间选择的太微妙了。

另外就是,12个省厅里面,在官僚,议员,首相,与党执行部的三角关系中,存在4种不同的类型,其中,财务/经企,总务/经产,是属于与首相,与执政党的执行部关系密切,积极的; 而厚生,农林水产/建设,确是与议员们的关系密切。—–这里和我的基本分析也是类似的,说明权力结构的变化,确实是出现了向首相权力集中的趋势。

日本在90年代后期出现CE的集权化,除去由于全球化的影响,去国家化,日趋深入

80年代政策制定的network 还集中于族议员;2002年的调查显示,就集中到首相了(至少官僚体系的调查问卷是这么说的)

而对于日本case的说明,主要是集中于2战后到90年代的主要环境的变化。

而且他认为,不能简单的说,官僚优位,或者是政党优位

86年,建立起了内阁5室,2001年经济产业咨询委员会, 2014年国家战略室NSC,

都是在加强首相的权力,削弱官僚的权力。

—————————————-总结部分

对于过去leadership论的批判和总结。

1,所谓个人主义的方法,强调环境和制度的结合, 在理论上的依据很薄弱

2, 没有分开政治system 的层面,以及执政的system 两个一大,一小的层面的区别。而CE论就很好的弥补了这一点。

—————————————–既存问题

日本确实是在变,但是伊藤老师也没有给出具体的答案,也没有对于core executive 究竟包括哪些具体的职位和人物(这里可以继续再定义的)。 in a word ,不能说是failed reforms, 但是可以说,the limits of reforms.

the firs attempt of the ‘modernisation’ of LDP_1963

在60年代反对日美安保浪潮,以及自民党从55年建党以来面对来自反对党的冲击,自民党党内就派阀的废除,党内决策过程等等,进行了三次组织调查会,期间曾发布Miki report , 一直到1963年的池田总裁答申,提出了一系列的改革方案。

party organization research council (1961-1963)

这在LDP党史上被称作是“党近(现)代化的推进”,但是结果却是差强人意,针对派阀等informal groups未有任何实质的限制和规制作用。 以下是福井治弘(Fukui Haruhiro )。 Fukui是较早系统的研究LDP党内组织的专家之一。著有“party in power: the Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy-making ” (1970) university of California press

日文版《自由民主党と政策決定》(1969)

以下节选自英文版page 105-106

Without denying the probability of some important changes being enacted in the not too distant future, it is nevertheless important to consider them in relation to the structural and behavioural characteristics attributed above to the various party organs, as they are currently constituted. The most important of these may be summarised as follows:

Firstly, the development of party organization, particularly the cluster of policy-making organs represented by the PARC, has shown that it is much easier to multiply and fragment the operational and functional units involved than to rationalize and strengthen the existing ones. In fact, the over-expansion of these organs has obviously imposed excessively heavy strains on the available manpower which has been limited, as far as the responsible positions are concerned, to members of the Diet. No change aimed at modernising the policy-making and leadership structure of the party would prove really meaningful or helpful unless it involved effective control or reduction of the number of organs and possibly appointment of non-parliamentary members to party positions so far monopolized by Diet members. In view of the steadily increasing volume of demands for public decisions which come to the party, the ultimate solution may call for a basic redefinition of the role of the party in the system of government, negating the view that the ministerial party must not only be informed of, but actually review and pass judgement on, every single demand for public decision.

Secondly, the influence of the factions and other informal intra-party groups is detrimental to the assertion of effective leadership by the formal party organs and to their smooth functioning, particularly the policy making chain represented by the PARC and the executive council, and the party presidency. The efforts so far made to combat the growth of these informal groups have met little success. If the basic aim of the modernization movement is to centralize the effective power of policy-making in the hands of the formal party organs, and if the factions, as is likely, should remain as resistant as in the past to a movement aimed at their liquidation, then they are bound to present the most formidable obstacle to that movement and may well ultimately defeat it.

Thirdly, the ineffectiveness and lack of authority of the formal party leadership in the intra-party decision-making process has been paralleled by its vulnerability and, at times, subservience to the influence of external groups, particularly the bureaucracy and interest groups. A similar pattern of relationship has obtained between formal party branches and prefectural federations on one hand and supporters’ associations built around individual politicians on the other. The difficulty lies in balancing the need to secure material and spiritual support from a wide range of external groups (particularly for the purposes of elections), and the demand for the party’s freedom of action and independence from pressures inevitably applied by such groups. This dilemma, which is certainly not peculiar to the LDP or the Japanese parties, is likely to remain unresolved and even aggravated for a long time to come and may prove, like factionalism, fatal to modernisation efforts.

而致力于废除派阀的努力,一直到实施SMD选举制度改革20年后,才初见效果。但是也很难说,faction 作为Informal group 就失去了分派职务,党内沟通,资金调动,以及政策学习的功能,只能说比起60-80年代的强势时期,如今的派阀在分派职务和资金调动方面日渐式微。

但是如果放到OECD国家中去比较,同样60年代开始政党现代化,LDP虽然开始的早,但是步伐小,效果不佳?还是说anti-elite 的formal rules 也好,informal rules 也好,在日本都需要较长的时间发挥作用?还是与LDP 长期的执政有关?2012年LDP卷土重来,再次质疑制度派的期待,是不是有别的factor 被忽略了呢?

OECD的比较请参考“politics at the centre一书。

Debating on leadership selectorate_how should we choose a party leader?

Politics at the Centre: the selection and removal of party leaders in the Anglo Parliamentary Democracies,
*William Cross
*Andre Blais
Oxford University Press.2012. Page 168-171

Rational of focusing on the leadership selection:

We began this book with the twin observation that political parties operate at the center of modern democracies, and that their leaders exercise considerable authority over political affairs both within and outside the party.
We have argued that given this centrality of party leaders in public decision-making, it is important to consider how they are elected, and, how, and to whom, they are held to account.

Rational of broadening party leadership selectorate

① Anti-elite

Elite control of the leadership selection process is perceived to be ‘anti-democratic’
greater democratization of the selectorates

② Strategy to attract new members

The leadership campaign is an opportunity for the party to revitalize by attracting new members, and that the participation of large numbers of voters gives the leader greater legitimacy and a broader mandate

③ Prevention of declining membership

Parties have an interest in building an activist core. Declining rates of voter turnout in many countries make these local, priming activities all the more important. Parties also benefit from large membership through claims that this provides them with greater legitimacy and strengthens their ties with civil society.
(Seyd, 1999) One of the reasons their numbers are in declining is because of a sense on the part of partisans that there is little meaningful power granted to rank-and-file members. (Cross and Yong, 2008) They increasingly view parties as elite dominated. Including members in the choice of the leader provides them with influence over one of the party’s most important decisions may provide an important incentive to membership.

Rational of Limitations on the size of selectorate

① Professional and effective judgment

It is the parliamentary who are best to judge the relative merits of would-be leaders.one of the principal tasks of the leader is to direct the party in parliament and that it is crucial that she has the support of the parliamentary caucus to do so effectively. The MPs are best situated to judge the candidates’ abilities to lead the party in election campaigns. It is in the party’s interest to place the selection authority with those who have a strong personal incentive to choose an electorally successful leader. 

(But is it for party’s interests or for the people?)

② Threatens the integrity of the party

It undercuts the integrity of the party. It places brand new recruits, with no history of party activism, on equal footing with longtime activities who have an ongoing commitment to the party’s well-being. This has led to charges of the leadership being decided by ‘tourists’ to the party.

*Seyd,Partrick 1999. “New Parties/New Politics? A Case Study of the British Labor Party” Party Politics 5 (3), pp383-405

*Cross, William & Lisa Yong. 2008. “Factors Influencing the Decision of Young Political Engaged to Join a Political Party: A Investigation of the Canadian Case”, Party Politics 14 (3), pp. 345-69.