The Electoral Foundations of Japan’s Banking Regulation_Frances Rosenbluth (Yale) and Michael F. Thies (UCLA)

The Electoral Foundations of Japan’s Banking Regulation

(APSA annual meeting 2001 )


This paper locates Japan’s financial policies in the context of electoral incentives.  The collapse of Japan’s economic bubble in 1990 exposed the rot in the banking system, hidden for decades by a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government intent on maintaining favor with local support groups, and protecting inefficient small banks.   In a move wholly uncharacteristic of Japan’s postwar politics, the LDP ultimately forced the banks to absorb huge losses rather than require taxpayers to bail out their mortgage-lending subsidiaries (jusen).  We compare the government’s subsequent bank bailout scheme with past government action and find that the government’s objectives have shifted from boosting bank profits to ensuring their prudential regulation.  We conclude on an optimistic note about the prospects for more public-goods oriented politics in Japan.

本来是在看rosenbluth大概20年前发在APSA的一篇文章, the electoral fortunes of legislative factions in Japan.

是篇异常精彩的文章!~ 学习了!! 尤其是论证的思路,乃至于文章的写法,都非常的合我心意,而且他们当年遗漏的有关PARC(自民党党内政务调查会)的角色和作用,恰好是我目前在前进的方向,看的非常开心,真难得。



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