Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan.
Pepper D. Culpepper. Cambridge University Press. 2013.
Managers , bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan
主要是针对90年代后期，尤其是2004-2005年期间在日本资本市场中恶意收购事件，livedoor恶意收购FUJI TV； sumitomo 收购UFJ
这当中，执政党LDP， 政府官僚，财经界， 三方博弈的过程和结果。
非官方的CVSG（corporate value study group ）就是其中一个极好的佐证。
The Japanese political system remains favorable to the protection of managerial interests, given the long and close ties among business, the bureaucracy, and the Liberal Democratic Party.
Thus even on high salience issues, it would be surprising if Japanese managers were unable to exercise important political influence. The theory of quite politics leads us to expect that the effectiveness of different tools of business influence varies according to political salience.
The future functioning of the new rules of corporate control in Japan, which provide an important role for oversight of takeover activity by courts, will likely depend on whether the issue continues to be one of high salience. If it does not, the dynamics of quiet politics will reassert themselves and these dynamics do not favor interest groups that oppose the managers of large companies.