Electoral studies 近年日本に関する、選挙制度、特にＳＮＴＶに関していくつか論文がある。
Kuniaki Nemoto, Matthew S. Shugart:
Localism and coordination under three different electoral systems: the national district of the Japanese house of councilors.
Democratic representation involves tradeoffs between collective actors—political parties seeking to maximize seats, and individual actors, candidates seeking to use their personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) to maximize their own chance of election and reelection
We analyze these tradeoffs across three different electoral systems used at different times for the large magnitude nationwide tier of Japan’s House of Councillors.
These electoral systems, closed and open list proportional systems and the single non-transferable vote, differ in the extent to which they entail candidates seeking individual preference votes and in whether collective vote shares affect overall party performance. We use local resources as a proxy for PVEA and seek to determine the extent to which parties nominate “locals” and how much the presence of such locals affects party performance at the level of Japan’s prefectures.
Implications from this research:
*First, any electoral system can contain a potential collective-individual tradeoff.
SNTV necessarily puts the leadership in a much more difficult situation than other systems, as parties need to care about the personal appeals of candidates. They are expected to diffuse mobilization efforts, while their first target for mobilization would be local personal supporters. Upon completing the nomination process, a party cannot stop locals from taking advantage of their local networks. The less risky solution therefore is just to minimize such localized candidates. Meanwhile, under OLPR, a party’s collective goals and candidates’ individual strategies coincide, to the extent that a party simply lets them have laissez fair competition as even narrow appeals are useful to the party.
*Second, localism and personal vote seeking are not always the same.
One of our major findings is that candidates under SNTV tried to mobilize their votes across the country, rather than concentrating their efforts regionally like these under OLPR. This is surprising if we assume that the higher “incentive to cultivate a personal vote” under SNTV would also mean greater localism. We do not dispute that dispute that the personal vote incentive is higher under SNTV, where such voters are the only factor separating winners from losers not only within parties, but also across them. What our results- among the few ever to compare SNTV and OLPR, do remind us is that the personal vote is not synonymous with localism, at least in a very large district. Given the high magnitude of the Japanese house of Councillors national tier, to be among the top winners under SNTV requires a personal vote built on more than one’s local resources. By contrast, given OLPR, a personal vote based on local ties may be sufficient to win a seat, and even if it is not, such votes poll at the party level and hence are a valuable resource to the party collectively.
*Third, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on the candidate selection and recruitment process and its political consequences. In explaining a variation in types of candidates across countries, the literature puts emphasis on party organization (how decentralized the process is) and selectorate( how open the process is to party members or even voters). If a party has a decentralized organization in which local branches and local party members select candidates, we should see more local candidates. Japanese parties were once well known for their fragment and factionalized organization. Where there were open seats, typically faction leaders recruited second, or third generation candidates recommended by prefectural branches, while the leadership in Tokyo had only a limited voice in the recruitment process. With the electoral reform for the first chamber from SNTV to MMM in 1994, however, the party leadership is now more centralized than ever in the candidate recruitment process, often bypassing local branches’ recommendations, as typified by Koizumi’s attempt in 2005 to nominate official LDP candidates- “assassins” or shikaku, competing against those who defected from his line. Thus according to the recent literature, we should observe fewer local candidates as party leaders are more likely to nominate party loyalists from Tokyo. Despite these structural transformations in party organization, we find a jump in local candidates running for the second chamber only after 2001, suggesting electoral formula as a key factor in explaining types of candidates.
Reuven Y. Hazen & Gideon Rahat
Democracy within Parties: Candidate selection methods and their political consequences.
Oxford University Press. 2010.
论文第一作者，Nemoto的导师，Ellis Krass在89年与Takeshita Ishida 合著的书里面就强调了，就政党研究而言，日美之间可比性乏善可陈，可是日欧比较可能会有新的突破。这篇文章事实就是在Hazan的研究基础上的深化，和对于日本参议院的case的check 和cross study.
放在这里来说就是，为什么decentralized的候选者选拔，加上Limited open selectorate 的候选人投票过程，日本的leadership selection 却出现了类型同一化的结果？ 那就是我一直在思考，how a wilder selectorate produce more hereditary leaders in LDP ?
Sartori 不欣赏large N, 对于case study青睐有加。但是眼下的popular的却是大数据。嗯，这里集中用了参议院的数据，中规中矩，但总觉得，没有逃出hazan的框架。而hanzan的研究在扉页里面提出来的internal democracy 问题在混合制的参议院中的问题，似乎还可以进一步深入。