Is there no way of bridging this gap? (Between case study and generalizing)
In theory, that is, methodologically speaking, we do have to choose between alternative strategies of inquiry.
In practice, that is, in our actual proceedings, the comparativist is required to draw on the information provided by single-country, configurative studies; and, conversely, the single-country specialist who ignores comparative findings harms his own endeavor.
Comparing and Mis-comparing
Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(3): 243-257(1991)
The CSRC had initially barred Everbright from trading using its own money for three months after erroneous buy orders on Aug. 16 sparked the biggest swing in China’s benchmark equity index since 2009. The misstep, combined with glitches this month at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and in the Nasdaq Stock Market, has fueled concern that electronic trading systems are unreliable.
“The punishment sends a signal to the market that the CSRC will not tolerate irregularities,” Chen Xingyu, a Shanghai-based analyst at Phillip Securities Research, said by phone today. “This is a long process: The system risk won’t be removed just because of the Everbright incident or just by getting one brokerage to behave.”、
China’s 2010 census revealed a population of 1.34 billion, 50 percent urban, 13.3 percent
above age sixty, and with 118.06 boys born for every 100 girls. In this article, we discuss
how gender imbalance, population aging, and their interaction with rapid urbanization
have shaped China’s reform era development and will strongly shape China’s future.
These intertwined demographic changes pose an unprecedented challenge to social and
economic governance, contributing to and magnifying the effects of a slower rate of economic
growth. We organize the analysis according to the proximate determinants of economic
growth: first, labor input and its productivity; second, capital investment and
savings; and finally, multi-factor productivity, including social stability and governance.
We argue that the economic, political, and social context that turns labor and capital
inputs into economic outputs is perhaps the most important and least understood
arena in which demographic change will shape China’s rise.
AT FIRST sight, China seems to have a superb banking system. Its state-controlled banks, among the biggest and most profitable in the world, have negligible levels of non-performing loans and are well capitalised. That appears to suggest that the country’s approach should be applauded.
Not so. For one thing, though China’s banking system is stable, its banks are not as healthy as they seem. The credit binge of recent years has left them with far higher levels of risky loans than they acknowledge. And a profit squeeze is coming. The banks are having to work harder to keep both their biggest depositors, who are tempted by alternative investment products, and their biggest borrowers, who are turning to the bond market instead. As a consequence, the country’s Big Four banks—Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank—will no longer make easy money by merely issuing soft loans to state-owned enterprises, or SOEs (see article).
Excess of caution
China’s new leaders have acknowledged that the old approach has led to excesses, notably overcapacity in state industries. They are talking of allowing more private (but not foreign) investment in the financial sector and are urging banks to lend more to private firms. That is not enough.
For a start, China should end financial repression. If deposit rates were gradually freed, banks would be forced to compete with each other for depositors and free to win back customers now lost to the shadow banking system. Most Chinese banks have no clue today about customer service, risk management or credit assessment. That would have to change. Miserable returns on bank deposits encourage punters to plough money into real estate and other riskier investments, so paying decent deposit rates might help prick the property bubble, too.
Second, China needs to go beyond banking. In many developed economies, non-bank firms and financial markets vie with banks to issue credit, but in the Middle Kingdom（哈哈，一贯的冷哟） banks still dominate. In recent years Chinese firms raised nine times as much money from banks as they did on the country’s stock exchanges. The corporate bond market has grown quickly of late (and big banks no longer gobble up most of the offerings). This growth should be encouraged.
Third, China must separate banking from crony state capitalism. The best way to do this is privatisation. 继续鼓励和提倡私有化Smaller banks like China Merchants and China Minsheng, in which private investors have significant stakes, lend much more energetically to small businesses and households than do the state-controlled goliaths.Privatising the Big Four would help（哇哦？！）, though it would make it harder for the state to manage any future banking crisis. And as long as sheltered, oligopolistic SOEs exist, banks will lend disproportionately to them because they enjoy implicit state backing. So the big SOEs must themselves face greater market discipline.
Finally, China should welcome competition, from abroad and at home. Two Chinese internet giants, Tencent and Alibaba, are starting to provide wealth management, investment funds and other financial services. Banks are lobbying against them. Regulators worry about the destabilising effect of start-ups with new business models, but for newcomers that do not pose a systemic risk they can afford lighter-touch regulation.
None of these changes should happen overnight. They can be implemented gradually. But a bit of disruptive innovation would be good for China’s stodgy banks, and its people.